

**Best Student Essays, Political
Sciences**

Department of Humanities and Social Sciences

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Political Sciences best essays

1. Proposed Solutions to Resolve the Kashmir Dispute – Is there a Pragmatic Way Forward?
2. The impact on women of the partition of Punjab 1947.
3. Analyse the reasons for Afghanistan's continued hostility
4. Partition of Punjab

Title: Proposed Solutions to Resolve the Kashmir Dispute –
Is there a Pragmatic Way Forward?

Student : Daniyal Aijaz Wahid

Instructor: Shaharyar M.Khan

Course : Critical Issues in Pakistan's Foreign Relations

Code : POL 433 –

The hostile nature of Indo-Pak relations has been subject to a number of underlying factors which have been rooted in history and have led to major conflicts in the region. The precipitous and ill planned departure of British colonialists from the sub-continent left the nascent state of Pakistan struggling for its due share of assets and dominion over the princely states. The dispute over Kashmir was critical in shaping the relationship between the two nations from the onset as it offered a predominant geo-political advantage to the country it would accede to. The enormity of the Kashmir problem can be gauged from the fact that the two nations were at war in October 1948, just a year after partition. The war ended when the UN intervened declaring a ceasefire and demanding a free and impartial plebiscite to decide the fate of Kashmir. Unfortunately, the plebiscite was never held and the tension surrounding Kashmir has escalated ever since. In another attempt to wrest the disputed region Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar in the summer of 1965. Once again the war was largely inconclusive because in the end both countries had to cede any territory they had captured and effectively the two countries had reached a stalemate. Apart from the two wars the international community in collaboration with the respective governments made several proposals and suggestions on how to resolve the Kashmir issue. The problem still remains unsettled and was aggravated by the Kargil War and reported incidences of “cross border terrorism” across Kashmir. For the past few decades, Pakistan and India have been playing diplomatic tug-of-war over the Kashmir issue at various international forums to achieve a mutually acceptable solution. However, there has not been any substantial progress in resolving the matter. This paper describes the major proposals that have been put forth to bring about a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute; particularly granting independence to Kashmir, Sir Owen Dixon’s proposal, the Chenab formula, the Four point plan and the Andorra model.

“Kashmir is the Jugular vein of Pakistan and no nation or country would tolerate its Jugular vein remains under the sword of the enemy.”

Quaid e Azam

The above statement was made by Quaid e Azam in his inaugural speech on the eve of independence. The declaration symbolizes the significance of Kashmir to Pakistan. Kashmir

apart from having a Muslim majority is vital to Pakistan for many reasons. Firstly, the three main rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, flowing into Pakistan pass through Kashmir offering a vantage point to control the flow of water. This is particularly important for Pakistan's agrarian economy. Secondly, Kashmir is a strategic location from a military point of view. Lastly, there are strong ethnic, cultural, geographical and historical linkages to Kashmir.

It was clear after the first Indo-Pak war of 1948 that Kashmir was now a matter of growing concern in the international arena as it gravely threatened the establishment of peace in the subcontinent. The UN stepped up by nominating Sir Owen Dixon, a judge of the Australian High court, as their official mediator to address the Kashmir dispute in May 1950. Dixon was highly revered as an arbitrator and a diplomat. In a letter to the Prime Minister of Kashmir, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, Nehru praised Sir Dixon for having a "high reputation for independence, integrity and ability"; Originally, Sir Dixon suggested establishing a single government for the whole State of Jammu Kashmir during the period of the plebiscite (Hussain). The government could be selected from the two rival countries; a neutral body of trusted individuals could administer the plebiscite; or an executive body of UN representatives could be chosen. This recommendation was rejected by both India and Pakistan. Stymied by the resistance, Sir Dixon came up with two alternative plans for Kashmir. The first entails taking a region-by-region plebiscite, allocating each area to either Pakistan or India, according to the vote (Hussain). Pakistan turned down the proposal quoting India's former agreement to a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir as a whole. India partially agreed to a plebiscite which would be restricted to the Kashmir Valley and a few adjoining areas. However, India had an impractical demand regarding the remaining areas so there was an impasse and this plan was rejected. The second option referred to as "The Dixon Plan" was probably closer to achieving a solution than any other plan ever since. To this day, the people of Kashmir nostalgically recall "the Dixon Plan" and long for the day when it can be put into effect (Noorani). According to the plan Ladakh was allotted to India, the Northern areas and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir were assigned to Pakistan, Jammu would be split into two, and a plebiscite would be held in the Kashmir Valley. The plebiscite would be conducted by UN officials, but required complete demilitarization in the region. Once again, Sir Dixon was frustrated by the lack of consensus as Pakistan opposed demilitarization

and India did not concur with the idea of a plebiscite in the Vale of Kashmir as it was certainly going to lose out. In retrospect, “The Dixon Plan” could have spared the two nations over half a century of violence and suffering but, the two sides were too uptight and stubborn to realize the efficacy of the plan.

A viable option put forth by intellectuals in the early 1960s was the Chenab formula which envisaged the division of Kashmir along the River Chenab. According to the ‘Chenab Formula’, Pakistan may consider ‘Doaba’, a narrow strip of land between Chenab and Ravi in the suburbs of Shakargarh, stretching up to Chhamb, Dhodha and Rajwari districts as international border (Hussain). The idea was particularly appealing for Pakistan as it brought the Muslim majority Kashmir Valley, west of the River Chenab, under the banner of Pakistan. Consequently, the Hindu majority region of Jammu, east of River Chenab would go to India. With the inclusion of Ladakh, which also lies north of the Chenab River, India would be left with approximately 3,000 square miles of territory out of 84,000 square miles (BBC). This was a straightforward victory for Pakistan but, India was not willing to change the status quo. The Chenab formula was revisited in 1998 when Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Nawaz Sharif in Lahore in an attempt to restore peace. There was an air of optimism surrounding the talks and a promise of a comprehensive negotiation over Kashmir. According to former foreign secretary Niaz A. Naik, the proposal had been discussed during the unofficial efforts to normalize relations between Islamabad and New Delhi, known as track-II diplomacy, and Vajpayee “had also evinced interest in it” (Hussain). Two changes were recommended in the formula to ensure a more equitable division of the region. Firstly, Kargil would go to India and the remaining areas north of Kargil would join Pakistan. Secondly, Pakistan would have to give up the Buddhist majority region of Ladakh. The glimmer of hope that had emerged from the talks was crushed with fall of the Vajpayee government and the Kargil war in early 1999. The Kargil incident holds an indelible place in the history of the two countries and reflects the ever increasing tension that exists in the region due to the dispute over Kashmir. At this stage the possibility of engaging in peace talks over Kashmir had become a myth since India felt infuriated by Pakistan’s betrayal.

The Four point plan was an informal proposal that evolved as a result of peace talks in 2006 between former President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, and Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh. The plan was prescribed by Musharraf to act as a roadmap towards peace in

Kashmir. Firstly, the plan recommended self governance for the people of Kashmir. Secondly, demilitarization of the region to bring an end to the ongoing violence. Thirdly, the gradual dissolution of the line of control as the border creating free movement and trade between the two countries. Lastly, Kashmir would be jointly managed by a group comprising of members from India, Pakistan and the two Kashmiris. The group would manage common interests and common issues like trade, tourism, river waters, etc. (Ali). Musharraf did make a case with his proposal as he was able to meet the four limitations needed for agreement over any accord on Kashmir. Firstly, the LOC becomes a mere line on a map; secondly, both sides are already agreed on the quantum of self-rule which their respective parts will enjoy under an international agreement; thirdly, there will be a joint mechanism of Kashmiri leaders to coordinate policies on matters of common interest and fourthly, there will be agreed withdrawal of troops on both sides (Noorani). Unfortunately, the four point plan was never discussed in the Parliament as a serious option, and before steps could be taken to materialize it, Musharraf was forced to resign in 2007. Following the departure of Musharraf successive governments abandoned the plan deeming it as undemocratic. It is worth noting that there was appreciable progress towards finding a solution for the Kashmir issue and the Foreign Minister of Musharraf's government even claimed that "the agreement between India and Pakistan on Kashmir was just a signature away" (Ali). In 2008 the Mumbai bombings struck a defining blow to any bilateral agreement between the two countries. The incident was used by India to legitimize its claim of Pakistan harboring militant groups, especially in Kashmir, to carry out terrorist activities. The Mumbai bombings had robbed Pakistan with any leverage it held over negotiations with India.

Over the years Kashmir has been the subject of various investigations and studies in political literature. Many scholars have proposed solutions that have been successful in resolving border disputes in the contemporary world. The Andorra model is one such instance. For a long period of time France and Spain tried to gain hegemony in Andorra. The dispute between France and Spain over the region started in 803 AD and the solution was arrived in 1993 (Hussain). Angola was granted an independent constitution in 1993, while Spain and France jointly continue to manage foreign affairs and defense. We can draw a parallel between the Andorra and Kashmir to come up with a similar solution for the latter. Applied to Kashmir, the Andorra model would have India and Pakistan agreeing to declare the LOC as the international border, then jointly guarantee 'independence' of the Valley (Ahmed). Kashmir would function with complete

autonomy while Pakistan and India would manage foreign affairs and defense. Unfortunately, both India and Pakistan are unwilling to give up any part of Kashmir as they consider it a lawful part of their land. It must be realized that the two nations are going nowhere with the Kashmir issue at the moment and the Andorra model might just be the way to end the suffering of the people of the valley for whom hope is running out quickly. Both India and Pakistan seem to be upset over the prospect of 'autonomy' in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, but what they do not like may be what is good and necessary (Ahmed).

The human and economic costs caused by the Kashmir dispute over the last 67 years mean that neither nation will be willing to sacrifice its claim over the region. The countless peace talks between the two nations, as well as internationally has always led to an impasse. Armed warfare compounded the problem even further and the recent terrorist activities have made bilateral dialogue a virtual myth. It is important for the countries to realize that the way forward for Kashmir will require the respective governments to be more flexible in their approach towards the issue. I believe the current situation demands a revised view of the problem and instead of looking for a division of Kashmir the two neighbors should focus on economic development of the region. New Delhi and Islamabad must muster the political will to leave aside their vested interests in Kashmir and focus on the betterment of the people of the valley since they have suffered for too long. The utility of forging enhanced economic opportunities for the people of the region should be the current mission with the hope that it may prepare the ground for the eventual resolution of the debate (Burki). The idea of “making borders irrelevant” is something that has been endorsed by both countries. Since 2005, Pakistan and India have pursued out-of-the-box thinking on Kashmir and have allowed nominal human interaction and economic exchanges across the LOC (Yusuf). One of the most promising recent developments has been the formation of the Federation of Jammu and Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Joint Chamber), the first formal joint establishment across the LOC, which is poised to play central role in future efforts at increasing economic collaboration (Yusuf). Tourism, forestry, waterways, education, anti-poverty programs, power generation and transportation are the major avenues that should be focused upon to boost the economy in the region. The present thaw in Indo-Pak relations has provided an opportunity to use cross-Loc relations as a means not only to increase the prosperity levels of Kashmiris on either side but also to use the interaction as a means of ameliorating conflict (Yusuf 17). The cross LOC development process is a gradual one but I

believe it is the most pragmatic way forward since it reduces the tension in the region and ensures a prosperous Kashmir.

In the long run the two nations can work out further ways to improve economic collaboration and possibly repair the damage that has been done. A viable objective is granting most favored nation (MFN) status to India. This would mean greater cooperation and better trade between the two countries. Once the two nations realize the economic potential they can achieve by working as an alliance the Kashmir issue can then be addressed with lesser distrust and greater flexibility. A significant step whilst moving forward would be the gradual demilitarization in Kashmir. This would mean the two nations are ready to put the past behind them and work for Kashmir.

Proposals like the Andorra model do not suit the dispute as both nations want to have a say in running the affairs of Kashmir so in the long run India and Pakistan should rule Kashmir as a confederation granting partial autonomy to Kashmir. This policy is the most desirable option to end the deadlock as all three parties will have a say in the government and will foster better relations between the two nations.

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[Type the company name]

Title: The impact on women of the partition of Punjab 1947.

Student: Ramsha Amir

Instructor Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed

Course: The Partition of Punjab History Politics and processes

Code: POL 3114

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To experience the pain, hardships and sufferings of people of the partition of Punjab in 1947 it is very important to view the partition of Punjab from a humanistic perspective, (Ali 426) , which very few scholars have taken when writing about Partition of Punjab. This is because majority has viewed partition from an economic and political perspective. This essay will take a humanistic perspective and will see partition from a women's perspective and will discuss firstly, why we need to study women in the partition of Punjab 1947 literature. It will then discuss how women faced violence at three levels at the time of partition of Punjab, firstly, violence at communal level, violence at familial level and lastly, violence at national level. Lastly, this essay will discuss the efforts by respective governments in solving the problems of women who suffered in partition.

There is a need to discuss women, when talking about partition, because of couple of reasons. Firstly, there has been a historical silence when it concerns women (Menon). This historical silence is thus, compounded by familial silences, tales of rape, abduction or shift in religious priorities can hardly find a place in collective memory and must remain at the margins. Women did not reveal any sexual violence they personally experienced. This silence was so pervasive that scholars of partition ignored their extreme suffering in their work (Frischmann 3). Secondly, half of the millions who were uprooted, dislocated and killed in the eventful days of the partition were women (Ali 428). Women were in most cases the worst sufferers who endured pain and grief, faced enmity, humiliation and suffering and above all nostalgia for their lost homeland were left in new surroundings with a heart divided (Ali 427).

Women faced violence on three levels. First women faced violence at the communal level, as the members of other communities raped, abducted and mutilated women. Various examples prove this. Muslim men raped one thousand women in the presence of their families. However, this was not the end of trauma that these women endured. Muslims after killing the male relatives forced the women into sexual slavery as either wives or concubines. Shrimati Laj Wanti was 23 years old when she was abducted in August 1947. She was fleeing with her family from Kamoke, when a mob of Muslim men attacked her train (Frischmann). She describes her experience:

“Women were not butchered but taken out and sorted. I saw an old woman who cried for water while she was caught by her feet by a Muslim and flung twice on the ground and killed. The children were also murdered. I was taken by a Muslim man, Abdul Ghani to his home. He was a Tonga driver. I was kept in the house for over a month and I was badly used. I saw a large number of Hindu women in Muslim houses in Kamoke and all of them complained that they were badly used and mistreated (Frischmann 10)”.

Another women Bimla Bua, narrates:

“They caught hold of a beautiful 17 year old and her sister wouldn’t let go of her hand. They dragged them for a long distance and the girls kept calling ‘*bachao bachao*’. The *Kabailis* were collecting all the Hindus and Sikhs in a hideout. The two girls were already there, night fell, and they kept raping the women and eventually dumped them” (Frischmann 10).

GD Khosla interviewed 1500 women, in one account he claims:

“Young women and girls were molested and taken away. In one village, the relations of a girl were made to stand around in a ring, while she was raped by several men in succession” (Frischmann).

Rape was not the only suffering women went through, they were also mutilated. Bellies of pregnant women were ripped open and the unborn lives in bellies were thrown out. Anees Qudwai who worked as a social worker, in her memories she remembered:

“The volunteers told me of many women, who had Pakistan Zindabad Tattooed on their foreheads and names of rapists cut into their arms and breasts” (Frischmann).

Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed in his book, “Punjab bloodies, partitioned and cleansed” has taken various first hand interviews where many people confess witnessing men raping women in front of the families and many accounts prove that women and children were brutally treated, raped, molested and abducted. One such account is by Nirmal Tej Singh Chopra who states:

“I have witnessed Muslim youths shamelessly raping young girls in the presence of their crying parents, held firmly by the members of the gang, before killing all of their victims. In some cases the breasts of the women were cut brutally before they were killed. Passerby said that such incidents were happening all over the country (Ahmed 299)”.

Second, women faced violence at the familial level as they were encouraged to commit suicide or were murdered by the family members’ in order to protect the honor of the family. In Punjab, women who committed suicide during partition are regarded as martyrs. Basant Kaur was one of the survivors and in her interview with Urvashi Batalia; she remembered that the villagers were trapped in their houses for several days (Frischmann). Then men of the villages decided to kill all the girls. Men began killing their kinswomen:

“My husband, he killed his daughter, his niece, his sister and a grandson. He killed them with a Kirpan (Frischmann)”.

This phenomena of mass suicide of women during the partition of Punjab can be understood the way Urvashi Butalia has described that such actions were approved at

those times as women were protecting the honor of their communities and families in particular (Costa 142). Also conversion of women to another religion was also treated as a threat to the entire community (R.Brass 94). However, there were cases where many men stopped other men from killing their women. Batool Begum narrates:

“During the 1947 holocaust my maternal grandfather who was also the numberdar of his area learnt that the Sikhs of a small village near his village were determined to burn their women folk. He at once mounted his horse and rode at full gallop to the small village. He shouted at Sikh sardar to desist from burning any women. The leader replied that they would rather burn their women than risk them being kidnapped, raped or killed. However, my grandfather assured the Sardar that he would provide security for his women folk. His persuasions prevailed and the Sikh ladies were saved” (Ahmed 401).

The above account showed that the attitude of men towards their women varied from situation to situation, in some cases women were simply killed while in other areas the community men cared for their women folk. Urvashi Butalia told a story of Prakashvanti, whom she met in the Ashram in Jalandhar. Prakashvanti was a twenty year old woman wife who was living in Sheikupura which is now in Pakistan. As the Muslim gangsters were approaching her home, her husband asked her to kill herself. She refused to kill herself so her husband banged on her head due to which she fainted and her husband thought she is dead. Gangsters when they approached her home killed her husband and child and thought that she is dead so they left. The rest of her life she lived in Ashram (Ghosh). Apart from this account, Arifa Mehmood Siddiqui 80 years old living currently in Lahore, whom I interviewed is also an author of the book, Qaid-e-Yaghistan narrates how her father was a well know personality and how the women of her family were saved because of her father:

“We used to live in Lahore Cantt. My father was the friend of British and leader of Cantonment. I was born in 1934 and during partition I was 13 years old. My father was the leader of Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims. My father at that time did Engineering and was doing a government Job. At the time of Tehreek-e-Pakistan, my father and his best friend Sheikh Rehmullah left their government jobs and started doing their own personal work. He joined Muslim league and always used to win from Cantt area, no one dared standing against him in elections. One time, Qasim from Congress stood against him in the elections. Qasim badly lost the elections. My father had a lot of name and everyone was afraid of him at that time. Our house was surrounded by Hindu and Sikh neighbors. Everyone knew that my father had guns and swords. In March 1947, rioting started and situation started to worsen off. My dad all night used to stand in terrace with sword and use to make manly noises in order to protect the women of our family from outsiders. Even after partition it was not that women were helpless, many women including me contributed to this phenomena of partition by helping other women or by informing

general public and in this regard I contributed by writing a book ‘Qaid-e-Yaghistan’ (Siddiqui)”.

Third, women faced violence at the national level. This happened as new countries in particular India, forcibly recovered women, stripped them of their citizen’s right and in some cases asked them to abandon their wrong children (Frischmann 2). The recovery was a bit problematic because the police officers who were appointed to protect the women, themselves performed some of the worst crimes. Two assistant sub inspectors of police went to recover a non-Muslim woman in the west Punjab; however, the very same women were forcibly raped by those two police sub inspectors (Yadav 45). Tahira Begum, whom I interviewed, was a little baby at that time narrates her family incident of separation from her father who was left in Calcutta and how they migrated to a little village in Chiniot which is located in Punjab:

“In 1947, there was widespread looting, my father stayed in India, meanwhile I was little in the laps of my mother when she cleverly hiding from people travelled through the trains with the rest of the kids and reached Pakistan. Looting was evident not only in India but also in Pakistan where the government had imposed a curfew. We had no place to stay, so for few months we stayed at the stairs of someone’s house in Pakistan. There was a lot of trouble in finding food because there was a curfew. My dad had a well-established business of leather, one night Hindus looted my father, beat him and took over my dad’s business. After several years my dad came to Pakistan without any money, so he established his own little shop. He was in severe stress because all his money was taken over by Hindus and he was unable to fulfill the needs of his children and wife. This lead to the eventual death of my father in severe stress and then how my mother survived my memory cannot recall (Begum)”

From the above mentioned accounts one can observe a Hobbesian state of nature in the context of partition of Punjab. The state of nature in this case comes to be defined in which Hindus and Sikhs are engaged in mutual warfare over the control of sexually and reproductively active women. Women’s bodies became another location when a soldier could secure a foothold against the enemy (Frischmann 8). The Punjab experienced the worst kind of turmoil as its partition turned out to be very different from that of Bengal, both in character and magnitude. There were 73% estimated migrants from India in the Punjab, whereas only 9% of them came from East Bengal (Ali 430). The women were subjected to maximum humiliation. Number of women jumped into wells to save their honor and dignity. Nehru visited the village in Rawalpindi district on 14th March 1947 where he was told about the incidents of women jumping into the well. His photographer took photographs of the bottom of the well with the help of flashlight which showed decomposed limbs of body. One of the people present at that time, late Sant Gulab Singh said that his wife was the first to jump in the well (Singh). A touching story from Punjab of S Narain Singh, who belonged to Bathinda area gave shelter to a

Muslim girl who was young and whose parents died in communal riots at the time of partition. He got her admitted in the school along with his granddaughters. When she came of age, he was able to locate one distant relative of her through the Pakistan High commissioner officer. He also prepared dowry for her marriage (Singh). This shows that religion which many claim was the basis of partition or which led to riots wasn't visible in Narain's story as he comfortably offered hospitality to a Muslim girl.

Although women during partition suffered greatly, efforts were done by respectable governments to cater to the needs and demands of women who suffered during and after the partition. The government of India and Pakistan agreed to find the abducted women. The recovery of abducted women was brought under ministry of external affairs in India and Pakistan respectively. At the meetings of the two Prime at Lahore on 3rd September 1947, it was decided that both the central government and the government of West and East Punjab wish to make it clear that the forced marriages will not be recognized. Also it was decided that women and children who were abducted should be restored to their original families (Yadav 43). How far the recovery of the abducted women was carried out affectively, varied from situation to situation. For example there were instances in India, when the police vehicle entered the village to rescue the women the abductors would get to know and they would run away and hide in the nearby fields. In other instances, women were recovered with some effort. After recovery women were admitted to the recovered women's camps which were guarded by guards. Many described the condition of camps as simply cattle sheds. They had poor sanitation facilities and were over crowded. On the other side of the border, in Pakistan the conditions of camps were even worse. Women in those camps looked like skeletons as they had not eaten or taken bath for many days.

Partition of Punjab 1947 was surely a very brutal one when one accounts for the sufferings women had to go through, be it at the communal, familial or national level. One needs to note that the level of pain women had to go through was the same whether you were a Muslim, Hindu or Sikh, the fact that you were a women mattered and that was which was targeted. Many women lost their lives in order to protect the honor and dignity of their family members and many struggled in new places without their families' altogether. The government of both India and Pakistan played their parts after partition to honor these women but much more work needs to be done. Scholars also need to write more about the humanistic perspective of the partition syndrome rather than just the political perspective.

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Title: Analyse the reasons for Afghanistan's continued hostility towards Pakistan and its friendship with India.

Student : Syed Ali Moeed Tirmzi

Instructor: Ambassador Shahryar Khan

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Afghanistan's animosity towards Pakistan and consistent friendly relations with India surprises many Pakistanis. However, such a behavior has several reasons entrenched in the history of relationship between the two countries. This essay examines some of these reasons including the issues of Durand line, Pakhtoonistan, Trade, water and Pakistan's interference in Afghanistan internal affairs. However to clearly understand them, we will need to treat Afghans not as a monolith nation but rather a heterogeneous nation often consisting of power hungry rival factions.

The issues that soon began to rise after partition with Afghanistan were that of Durand line and the related issue of Pakhtoonistan. Durand line runs "from the Persian frontier to the Wakhan, the little area on which the British insisted to keep a distance between the British and Russian Empires." (Omran) it came into existence in 1893 due to the old great game between Soviet Union and British Empire. To understand this issue, we will need to understand the history of this area. The area around what is now Durand line has been traditionally inhabited by Pashtun tribes for whom war making has been their daily living for centuries; controlling these tribes was next to impossible. Mughals had tried controlling the area using various tactics including mass killing and settlements but tribal rebellions were inevitable. Soon after the fall of Mughals, an unsustainable Durrani empire emerged that had pushed the borders of Afghanistan to Indus. Soon British took over much of modern subcontinent and became increasingly worried about defining the frontiers of their empire. The existential threat of ever expanding Russian empire led to the concept of buffer zone. Afghanistan was to act as a buffer between the two empires. British first followed a closed border policy with regards to tribal areas which meant not extending the British Empire towards tribal area. However this was replaced by

forward policy which placed British troops in the autonomous tribal areas. They also tried pushing the horizons to Kabul but the attempts of first Anglo –Afghan war and the second Anglo-Afghan war and their consequent failure in retaining Kabul due to resistance from Afghans led them to believe that a formal border was necessary to negotiate. Eventually an agreement was signed between Sir Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdur Rehman regarding the Durand line.

There were several issues that were created by this new set up. The line divided some major Pashtun tribes and did not exactly follow any hard line geographical feature such as river or mountain range. This meant that with the poor map tools that existed in the 19th century, situation on ground at many places remained ambiguous. According to Sir Fraser Tytler, this line was “illogical from the point of view of ethnography, strategy and geography”. (Tytler 188) It divided Waziristan and Mohmand Tribal areas in two. Thus policing of borders was impossible when families were divided by a line. Internal policing also became impossible as Durand line was not acceptable to locals who saw British presence and control with hatred. This border has remained porous since then.

The line was an agreement between the British Crown and Afghan King. So when the British left and India gained independence, all settlements that had been with the British now collapsed in the eyes of Afghans. Pakistan eventually gained control of the semi-autonomous tribal regions through agreements with local tribes but the claim of Afghans that Durand line agreement was now null and void created bitterness. Border disputes between Pakistan and Afghanistan were so severe that Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan for

UN membership. This act was not well received by the India obsessed Pakistan which saw it being surrounded by unfriendly neighbors who did not want the newly created nation to survive.

Hatred between the two countries was also fanned by the idea of independent Pakhtoonistan comprising of tribal areas and Pashtun majority districts of then NWFP. Afghanistan also questioned the legitimacy of referendum in NWFP to join Pakistan after the absence of prominent Pashtun leaders like Khan Sahib and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. They had demanded the British to give Pashtuns an option to join Afghanistan or form an independent country which would eventually cede to Afghanistan. Support for separate Pakhtoonistan continued till 1979 in some form and a Pashtun Day was celebrated in Kabul to highlight this issue.

Since then, Afghans have not accepted Durand line as international border .They point to extra ordinary circumstances and pressure in which it was signed with a party (British);now not in the picture. According to Vartan Gregorian "in 1893, caught between Russian pressure, British intransigence, and his own unwillingness and unpreparedness to start a war with the government in India, Abdur Rahman signed the Durand Agreement" (J.R.S.P). Afghan claim over the land beyond Durand line can be judged from what Amir said at the time of agreement "In your cutting away from me these frontier tribes, who are people of my nationality and my religion, you will injure my prestige in the eyes of my subjects, and will make me weak, and my weakness is injurious to your Government." (J.R.S.P)

According to Riaz Muhammad Khan the issue of both Durand Line and Pakhtoonistan has been an ill defined one with the objectives of Afghans never been realistic or clear. However

the governments in Kabul, no matter how weak they are, emphatically reject the idea and long standing Pakistani demand of turning into an international border. Be it someone like Karzai or the so called proxies of Pakistan i.e Taliban, none have accepted Durand line as international border as they feel they still have a claim on Pakistani land. "By 2005, Afghanistan had once again begun to celebrate Pashtunistan Day each August 31. Moreover, in February, 2006, President Hamid Karzai publicly dubbed the Durand Line a "line of hatred" and expressed that he did not accept it as an international border as "it raised a wall between the two brothers." (Siddiqi) Afghanistan has also blamed Pakistan of seeking advantage of its instability and weakness by extending the borders beyond Durand line. (R Yousafzai). Riaz suggests that Pakistan should accept that a conventional international border with Afghanistan "defy the region's history, geography and demographic realities" (Riaz 164). However this remains one of the biggest causes of animosity between two countries.

On the other hand India does not share any territorial boundary with Afghanistan nor does it have any Pashtun population. Thus it is natural for Afghans to see Pakistan as the heir of imperialist rule and not India. Afghans did not want Pakistan to take the place of British who had influenced them for past 100 years. As per Imtiaz Gul, Afghans "considered most parts of Pakistan's NWFP on the right bank of the Indus as lower and occupied Afghanistan" (Gul 3) Thus Afghans were never comfortable to see Pakistan replacing the role of British and wanted to assert them. This was one of the causes for initial aggression of Afghans towards Pakistan.

Afghanistan is a ethnically diverse region with Pashtun's comprising about 40% ,Tajiks 30% and Hazaras 15% of the total population. No single party represents fully any of the ethnic

group. In such a case Pakistan has been often forced to deal with certain groups rather than one strong government in its relationship with Kabul. Historically an oft adopted policy by Pakistan has been of supporting certain faction in Afghanistan, which has not gone down well with Afghans. Pakistan has often taken sides in the internal disputes of Afghans. During Soviet occupation and after their withdrawal, Pakistan supported “the tanzimat” i.e the seven mujahedeen groups. After the failure of mujahedeen to establish any order, Pakistan supported the indigenous Taliban movement which started independent of Pakistan’s help popular despite the popular myth that they were ISI’s brainchild. As per Riaz, the movement was beyond ISI’s “prowess or imagination” (56). Due to a large Pashtun population on Pakistan’s side of border and their strong influence in military and bureaucracy, Pakistan has always tended to support Pashtuns. Pakistan sees Taliban as representatives of Pashtun and thus calls for “Pashtun” involvement in any settlement of Afghanistan. This has not gone down well with Tajiks or Hazaras who see Pakistan as supporters of their rivals.

This view has given the impression that Pakistan wants a divided Afghanistan. In an interview, former Afghan spy master echoed this view as “when it comes to Afghanistan, they want to create limitations for us; treating us not as a nation, but as a sub-nation,” and “When Pakistan gives itself the right to fragment my nation along ethnic lines and harbor anti state elements on the soil of Pakistan to hurt us as a nation, there may come a time when we won't be possessing the policy of coming to you softly and begging you to have mercy on us. As a sovereign country, Afghanistan also has the right to reciprocate," (Radio) Compared to this, India has been much more flexible and broader in interaction with Afghans with developing linkages with not only Northern Alliance i.e the non Pashtuns alliance but also are willing to

work with moderate Pashtuns like Karzai. Meanwhile Pakistan has cornered itself by only maintaining good relations with hard line Pashtuns therefore segmenting a large part of Afghan society. Thus it is natural for them to loath Pakistan and be inclined towards India.

Pakistan has given the impression to the world, intentionally or unintentionally, that it can exercise control over the armed fundamentalist groups. Therefore the Afghans and the world felt that Pakistan could play an important role in bringing the hardliners to the table. Pakistan has failed to live up to this expectation twice in past two decades. It first failed to convince the Tanzimat to come to an agreement with Najib's government. Now it has failed to play any meaningful role in convincing the Afghan Taliban to have a meaningful dialogue with Karzai government. As per the current Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Jawed Ludin "Afghanistan is shocked by Pakistan's "complacency" in the nascent Afghan peace process and is ready to work without Islamabad's help on reconciliation" (Reuters)

As mentioned earlier, Pakistan is also seen as creator and supporter of Afghan Taliban. Naseer ullah Babar referred to them as "our boys" (Riaz 59) giving strength to this view. Despite the tyrannical rule of Taliban, the continuous support that Pakistan gave them has neither gone down well with the educated Afghans nor with Afghan Diaspora. Despite the gross human rights violation by Taliban especially with regard to women education, Pakistan remained the only country at the time 9/11 which supported the Taliban government economically and diplomatically. Even Saudi Arabia had withdrawn its support after Mullah Omer and Prince Turki heated argument. (Riaz) Thus they blame Pakistan for imposing the Taliban rule on Afghan people for its own interest. During all this time, India's views have been in line with the world's

rhetoric which has increasingly become intolerant towards terrorism. Therefore branding Pakistan as sponsor and supporter of terrorism in Afghanistan serves well for India and the weak Afghan government. This point of view has gained considerable ground within people of Afghanistan as suggested by a recent survey [“Afghanistan in 2013: A Survey of the Afghan People”](#) conducted by Asia Foundation. In response to reasons for disagreement with the aims of Armed Opposition groups, “they work for Pakistan” was the third most favorite option. Similarly “interference from Pakistan” was termed an equally big challenge as the presence of Talibans for Afghanistan. (DAWN)

Trade has also been a bone of contention in Pak Afghan relations. Afghanistan being a land lock country has relied on Pakistan to provide sea route for trade. But Pakistan has used this geographical advantage to its use to pressurize Afghan government. In 1950's when Durand line issue was hot, Pakistan would often delay Afghan transit goods in retaliation to Afghan government demands. Afghanistan being on friendly ties with India, has always wanted to increase trade with India. This would require a mechanism through which Afghan and Indian goods could pass through Pakistan's land. But due to the animosity that has been present between Pakistan and India, Pakistan has not allowed such a mechanism to be placed and have delayed it for years. Even when in 2010, a certain mechanism was brought into place, the public reaction and media was so huge that eventually nothing changed. Afghans blame lack of cooperation from Pakistan as one of the biggest hurdle in accessing one of the biggest trade markets in the world. (Tribune)

One can also not ignore the role that Indian influences have played in fanning hostility against Pakistan in Afghanistan. India and Afghanistan signed strategic partnership agreement in 2011 strengthening these economic ties. India being a bigger economic power has been able to contribute more towards Afghanistan's economy than Pakistan. Not only after fall of Taliban, but also in pre Taliban era, it has contributed through providing aid for construction work on roads, dams, parliament building etc. It has offered scholarships to Afghan students with currently more than 5000 students are studying in different universities in India (Embassy). Some of the recent contributions are even more noteworthy. In 2009, strategically important 231 km long Zaranj-Delaram road was completed with the help of India to provide an alternate route for access to Arabian Sea via Iran bypassing the needs of Pakistani ports. (Riaz 178) Afghan National Army officers are being trained in India for past two years in considerable number. (Times of India) Afghan airline was helped; it was essentially rebuilt through donations of planes and technical training from India. Good ties between the leaders of India and Afghanistan also played an important role. Many Afghan leaders and their families have lived and well in India. Even Karzai himself attended Simla University before Soviet invasion. . While Pakistan has also contributed towards Afghan economy rebuilding in post Taliban era but its share has been small. Most of the Afghan students studying in Pakistan are in madrassas who provide the ideological training for "Jihad".

Water is an issue that is slowly but surely poisoning the already bitter relations even more. Some of the main rivers from Afghanistan such as Kabul and Kunar River flow into Pakistan. Now that reconstruction work has started in Afghanistan and its energy needs are increasing, it is building dams to use its water resources using the help of India and world

community. This will substantially reduce the amount of water that flows into Pakistan from these rivers. Afghanistan being an upper riparian has the first access to water in case of non existence of a water treaty. In such a case, Pakistani concern over dams construction are obvious which are perceived very negatively in Afghanistan as suggested by recent comment by Karzai that “there are interferences from our neighbors to interrupt work on water dams in Afghanistan,” (Radio). Afghans have also showed extreme anger over construction of Dasu dam on Indus River by Pakistan and demanded World Bank to stop its loan for the project. (News)

Most importantly, Afghans blame Pakistan for treating it as its backyard. As part of strategic depth and strategic assets policy, Pakistan has tried to install a friendly government in Afghanistan. Among these efforts were an attempt to form Afghan Interim Government based in Pakistan in 1989 followed by support for hardliners like Hikmatyar to take over Kabul. (Riaz 18) Later Pakistani help was instrumental in Taliban’s military success over Massoud, Gulbadin and Dostum. Pakistan has also been accused of giving space to Quetta shura and harboring militants that carry out cross border terrorism. Pakistan’s meddling with internal affairs of Afghanistan has been seen as violation to sovereignty of Afghanistan. Factions are labeled as proxies of Pakistan even if they are not under any actual control of Pakistan. History suggests that Afghans have always been very particular about foreign interference and stand united against foreign invasions. Also while India has been able to maintain good relations with most Afghanistan neighbors including Iran and Central Asian states because of converging interests, Pakistan’s relation with these states have deteriorated over the years. These states have been anti Taliban and want to avoid import of Sunni extremism in their countries. Pakistan’s interests have been on the opposite side of the pole. This leaves Pakistan in isolation.

It has also been very obvious from past experiences that Afghans always act independently and do not feel in debt for any help they receive. Handpicked people like Karzai can even show stubbornness to the world's strongest power i.e USA. Recently Karzai has refused to sign the Afghan-US security pact (guardian) and released Taliban prisoners despite US objections (Washington Post) .Similar attitude was shown by Mullah Omer when he regularly rejected Pakistan's requests regarding different matters. He went ahead with the decision to destroy the historical Buddhas statues in Bamiyan despite Pakistan's Interior Minister visit to Kandhar for the very specific purpose of stopping it. In words of a former Pakistani diplomat "It is not in the character of an Afghan to be your puppet. They are famous for safe-guarding their self interest. They would listen to you when they think it is in their interest." (Gul 31)

Afghanistan tried to dominate Pakistan at the time of independence. After 65 years, it is fighting against the domination of Pakistan. The relationship between the two countries has lacked trust and respect for each other's sovereignty. Pakistan needs to understand that its wishes to control Afghans in return for help are farfetched. To move forward, Pakistani government and army will need to abandon any form of "strategic depth" they had wanted and regain the trusts of Afghan by supporting any government that they choose in a free and fair election. (2955 words)

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Title: Partition of Punjab

Student: Abdul Samad Khawja

Instructor: Ishtiaq Ahmed

Course: The Partition of Punjab History Politics and process

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Although Muslims were behind organized, large-scale violent attacks on Sikhs and Hindus in Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Attock districts in early March 1947 more Muslims died than Hindus and Sikhs counted together when ethnic cleansing had been completed by 31 December 1947.

Explain why.

Pakistan, the homeland for the Muslims of pre-partitioned India, came into being on 14th of August 1947. According to Ian Talbot, almost 18 million people crossed the border, making the migration from East to West and vice versa the largest reported forced migration in history. (qtd. in Ahmed, xxxviii) From the province of Punjab alone, approximately 10 million Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims were forced to cross the border for safer heavens. (Talbot qtd. in Ahmed, xxxviii) The partition of Punjab and the resulting massive migration was not the consequence of any one circumstance; instead it resulted from various developments that started as far as several years before the event of the partition. Moreover, as recorded in various books and sources this migration was by no means a peaceful one. A total figure of 1 million deaths has been recorded during the time of the migration and it is no secret that a majority of these martyrs were Muslims. The greater Muslim deaths is a fact agreed upon by various scholars of the three communities such as Sir Penderel Moon, Bhai Aridaman Singh Jhulbual and G.D. Khosla. (Ahmed, xxxvii) Lt. Genral. (Retd) Aftab Ahmad Khan confirms that at least 500,000 Muslims met martyrdom in East Punjab, with the figure being far less for the Hindus and Sikhs from West Punjab. (Ahmed, xxxvii) The question that then arises is how, despite being the aggressors of the large-scale violent attacks on the 'enemy', the Muslims lost more lives than the Hindus and the Sikhs combined. This paper will attempt to answer this question by first reviewing the attacks

launched by the Muslims in West Punjab, particularly in the Rawalpindi division and then will focus on the attacks on the Muslims in East Punjab. Finally, various facts and arguments will be put forth to illustrate why more Muslims died despite being the aggressors.

Prior to the events of violence, it is important to note the political developments that had occurred; in particular, religious revivalism of the twentieth century had found its way into politics and as a result the communal unity between the Hindus, the Sikhs and the Muslims had deteriorated. Although the idea of the partition of Punjab was popular among the Sikhs only, the idea of a separate homeland for Muslims was promoted as early as 1940 during the Lahore Resolution. Not surprisingly, religious differences were used as a tool to evoke the idea that the Muslims and non-Muslims are separate nations. It is also important to note that due to this religious revivalism all three religious communities eventually politically aligned themselves to three political parties: the Muslim League, the Congress and the Sikh Panthic Parties. (Ahmed, 529) Religion was used to demonize and dehumanize the opponents as well as to evoke a sense of belonging towards one's political party. (Ahmed, 70) This is perhaps most evident in the Muslim League 1945 election campaign when religion was used to gain votes. Slogans such as "Pakistan ka Na'ara kya? La ilaha Illallah. (What is the Slogan of Pakistan? It is that there is no God but Allah" (Ahmed, 83) were a key feature of the campaign. A natural consequence of this was that the members of the three communities tied themselves more closely to their political parties, which resulted in a further break down of a sense of communal unity and created a sense of fear towards the opposition or the 'enemy'. The direct action launched in January 1947 by the Muslim League which, as some argue, resulted in the fall of the Khizr ministry was yet another event that enhanced this sense of fear and hatred towards the 'enemy'. As a result, by the time the British decided to hand the power over to India, three separate identities had shaped and

matured, each represented a political party with its own interests. When these interests collided, violence was inevitable. Politics therefore played a key role in massive deaths that followed.

Trouble started in early March, following the resignation of Sir Khizr Hayat as the Prime Minister, when the prominent Sikh leader, Master Tara Singh, made inflammatory speeches against Muslims as well as the demand for Pakistan outside the Assembly Hall and called for a civil war in order to protect the Sikh interests (Ahmed, 130). Consequently, violence broke out in various parts of Punjab starting from “Lahore followed by similar outbursts in Amritsar, Jullundar, Multan and Rawalpindi...” (Ahmed, 530) The early attacks were ill-planned and were rather small-scale. They fared an even contest in which sometimes the Muslims were able to kill more Sikhs and Hindus, while at other times the Sikhs and Hindus had the upper hand. However, the attacks on villages in the Rawalpindi Division were defiantly one-sided in favor of the Muslims, and were certainly planned and well organized.

The Rawalpindi division was a Muslim majority area with only 14 percent non-Muslim population (Ahmed, 363). The rural areas surrounding the Rawalpindi city “witnessed some of the most vicious communal clashes [in mid March 1947].” (Ahmed, 363) An All-India-Congress Committee report noted that the attacks were no less than planned ‘military campaigns’ and that formal planning took place in mosques and the attacks were led by ex-armed men armed with modern weaponry such as rifles and grenades. It also noted the involvement of the local police in disarming the minorities by giving guarantees of protecting them. According to this report, the helpless minorities were first looted and killed and then had their houses and properties burnt down. Furthermore, forced conversion to Islam was a common feature of such attacks and the attackers were accompanied by Islamic clerics for this purpose. (Ahmed, 175) This procedure of extermination was carried out in villages of various districts such Jhelum and Attock. Accounts

of people belonging to these villages provide other important insights. For instance, all interviewees suggested that in all villages the Muslims were predominantly the poor and the attacks gave them an opportunity to loot the wealthy Hindus and Sikhs. With regards to the viciousness, many interviewees confirm that the Muslim attackers didn't even spare children or women. Dr Jagdish Chander Sarin bears witness to the fact that "the assailants [Muslim attackers] had chopped off the breasts of the women and raped them many times...Some children, even babies, had been pierced with sharp spear-like things and their bodies were waved in the air" (Ahmed, 188). Dr Jagdish provides another valuable insight: According to his knowledge, the attackers were Muslims who had survived the carnages in UP and Bihar (Ahmed, 188). These attacks were targeted at the Muslims of Calcutta and Bihar and had occurred in August and September/October 1946, respectively. (Ahmed, 78) Such an insight may partly explain the ferociousness of these attacks; seeking revenge was the main motivation behind such attacks.

All in all, as reported by General Messervy, the March riots in the Rawalpindi Division left some 40,000 Sikh and Hindu refugees, who moved to the East for safer heavens. Such a movement for the Sikhs and Hindus became common as the situation in Punjab worsened day after day. For instance, the migration from Lahore occurred in June when "large portions of Shahalmi were set on fire" (Ahmed, 535). By the time the Radcliffe award was announced, some 500,000 Hindus and Sikhs had already crossed the border. (Ahmed, 538) The Muslims of eastern Punjab however, made no large-scale movement until mid August, as is noted by Governor Jenkins (Ahmed, 537). One reason for this was the fact that it wasn't until late July that non-Muslims from East Punjab launched large-scale organized attacks on the Muslim minorities.

(Ahmed, 296) When they did, the viciousness was far greater than the March attacks on non-Muslims.

There is no reason to doubt that the Hindu and Sikh did have a plan to eradicate all Muslims from East Punjab by force and mass violence. Preparations had been ongoing for a while and escalated in light of the March attacks. The plan was however implemented as late as mid August, when the Radcliffe award was announced and many Muslims found themselves on the wrong side of the border. (Ahmed, 538) One can attribute the presence of so many Muslims on the eastern side of Punjab to the failure of the Muslim League in communicating necessary warnings about the partition to the Muslims. Many, especially in the rural areas, were unaware of the possibility that Punjab could be divided with the creation of Pakistan. Malik Muhammad Aslam of the Ferozepur district suggests that although Nawab Mamdot visited Ferozepur often, “he and his associates had never given any indication that Ferozepur would be excluded from Pakistan” (Ahmed, 428) A lack of information was perhaps another major reason as to why the Muslims, unlike the Hindus and Sikhs, stayed put and hence ended up suffering a comparatively greater loss of life than their Hindu and Sikh counterparts.

The organized, large-scale attacks launched by the Sikhs and Hindus were spread in various parts of East Punjab. It is therefore not within the scope of this paper to cover all of these attacks, however some generalities can be drawn. It is important to note the attacks occurred in the British territories of India as well as in the princely states where the British had no jurisdiction. Attacks on British India occurred in the Jullundar division, which included the prominent Ludhiana district, as well as in the Ambala Division and Delhi. The villages in these divisions met the same fate as the villages in the Rawalpindi Division, only on a much greater magnitude and level of organization (Ahmed, 538). The major attacks which took place in the

Princely states included organized attacks in Patiala, the Nabha state, the Faridkot state and many more. Although the Punjab Boundary Force (PBF) was established to smooth the transfer of population from east to west and vice versa, it had no jurisdiction in the princely states. Furthermore, it has been noted that the PBF proved ineffective even in the villages where it had the jurisdiction to act. (Ahmed, 538) Consequently, the attackers had an open hand in their attacks. Such freedom to commit violence is evident in a report of the Communist Party of India which mentions that Mr. Midha, a district magistrate in Jullandar, “gave the people clearance to commit mayhem by telling them to ‘do whatever they liked for three days’” (Ahmed, 436) A state of anarchy and statelessness had thus prevailed after the partition. Revenge, ethnic cleansing, or genocide- whatever the motivations might have been, the event of partition resulted in a blood bath.

All in all, over the calendar year of 1947, some 200,000-250,000 non-Muslims were reported dead or missing in the Khosla report (Ahmed, 541). Even if a pessimistic figure of the total deaths in the Punjab ranging between 500,000-750,000 is taken, it can be calculated that the number of Muslims deaths ranged from 250,000-500,000, a figure which has a lower bound equal to the upper bound of the number of deaths recorded for the non-Muslims. Therefore, it can be concluded, that more Muslims lost their lives than the Hindus and Sikhs combined. Bearing in mind the facts stated above, the question as to why this was the case can now be answered.

As will be illustrated, the major reasons for the greater number of Muslim deaths have already been mentioned in the facts stated above; reviewing the attacks conducted was therefore necessary. As has been suggested the Sikhs and Hindus had started moving towards East Punjab since the March attacks and by the time of the partition, some 500,000 had already migrated. The

Muslims however, stayed put. At least two reasons have been suggested for this action of the Muslims. Firstly, there were no reoccurring large-scale attacks on the Muslims in East Punjab until the end of July; they therefore had little reason to migrate early. Secondly, the Muslims had been kept in dark about the possible division of the Punjab and evidence suggests that most were confident that their respective districts would end up in Pakistan. As a result of the naivety of the Muslims, they were ill prepared to face the violence when it did occur and were thus not able to defend themselves as efficiently as the non-Muslims. One can also observe the Hindu Sikh migration from another angle: Some of the Sikhs who were forced to migrate as result of slaughter and looting of the Muslims, settled in the Princely states (Ahmed, 483) They brought with them tales of horror and torture they had suffered and as a result “the Sikh sense of honor was invoked and revenge for the crimes against their community and religion was declared to be the sacred duty of all self-respecting Sikhs” (Ahmed, 486) Hence, much like the Muslims from Bihar and Calcutta, these Sikhs too were motivated to take revenge and thus prepared themselves accordingly. The number of Sikhs with such a motivation, however, far exceeded the number of such Muslims from Bihar and Calcutta, and hence multiplied the magnitude and scale at which the later attacks were conducted.

The number of targets available is yet another important factor that needs to be considered. According to M. Hassan’s estimate, “if all Muslims left East Punjab, West Punjab would receive 5.9 million Muslims...if all Hindus and Sikhs were to leave West Punjab, East Punjab would receive 3.8 million Hindus and Sikhs...” (Ahmed, xxxviii) When one adds to this statistic the fact that 500,000 Hindus and Sikhs had already migrated before the partition and before the bloodshed occurred, it leaves almost twice as many Muslims as the Hindus and Sikhs who found themselves on the wrong side of the border right after partition. There were hence

more targets available to the Hindus and Sikhs in East Punjab than to the Muslims in West Punjab. Consequently, more Muslims met martyrdom than did the non-Muslims. Noteworthy here is the fact that all arguments presented so far point towards a classic case of the idiom 'forearmed is forewarned': As a result of the early March attacks, the Hindus and Sikhs, having experienced the cruelties of the Muslims, allowed themselves to be better prepared both in defense and offense. In offense they were well-organized and well planned and had a larger target available. In defense, a huge majority of the Sikhs had already migrated to safer heavens. One can also add the fact the Sikhs carried with them Kirpans (swords) by virtue of religion. This naturally strengthened the defensive efforts of the Sikhs. (Ahmed, 539) The Muslims therefore put a nail to their own coffins by attacking first and allowing the non-Muslims to prepare for the worse.

Finally, one needs to consider the advantage of the Princely states that the non-Muslims enjoyed when it came to committing acts of violence. As has been suggested, the British had no jurisdiction in these states. Attacks on the Muslims in these states could be carried out effectively and without interference from the British or the PBC. It is for this reason that a massive portion of the Muslim deaths in East Punjab were recorded in the Princely states. According to Mian Iftikharuddin, from the state of Patiala alone, approximately 200,000 Muslims were missing by November 1947 (Ahmed, 540). The independence of the princely states from the British therefore played an important role in contributing to more Muslim deaths than the Hindus and Sikhs combined.

To recapitulate the thesis of this paper, its arguments take the reader through a chronology of events that led to the partition of Punjab. Starting from the political developments before the violence escalated, it attempts to reveal how these might have contributed to the

massive bloodshed that followed. In particular, politics allowed the development of three distinct identities with different interests. When these interests collided, violence escalated as it did in early March, where the Muslims were the initiators of large-scale attacks. Based on the theory of ‘forearmed is forewarned’, the Sikhs prepared themselves in offense and defense and thus their response was much more brutal and better planned. Consequently, more Muslims lost their lives than did the Hindus and Sikhs. In a nutshell, this paper proposes that the answer to the question as to why the Muslims, despite being the aggressors of the large-scale violent attacks, lost more lives lies within the question itself: The Muslims conducting large-scale attacks and violence first, is in fact one of the major reasons why they ended up losing more lives. Forearmed is most certainly forewarned.

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